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In t~e Supre~ne Court 
of the State of Utah 
IX . THE JI. .. \ TTER OF THE 
APPLICATION OF JEROLD 
E. THO~IPSON, to change the 
point of diversion and place of 
use of 4.0 c.f.s. acquired by Appli-
cation No. 16833; Change Appli-
cation No. a-2017. 
JOHN C. ~IcGARRY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JEROLD E. THOl\fPSON and ED. _ 
H. WATSON, State Engineer of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CAsE No. 2528. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELI~IINARY STATEMENT 
The facts in this case are substantially as stated in the 
appellants' brief. However, we feel that the statement 
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2 
of some additional facts will afford the Court a more com-
prehensive picture of the pleadings and issues upon which 
the case was tried and the facts upon which the trial 
Court decided this cause. 
Following are the facts in sequence of time: 
On July 21st, 1945, one M. C. Hintz en entered into 
an agreement with John C. McGarry, plaintiff and re-
spondent, to purchase the south 100 acres of the southeast 
quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South of Range 16 
West, Salt Lake Meridian (Plaintiff's Ex. 1). 
On August 17th, 1945, Hintzen made application to 
appropriate 4.0 c.f.s. of water from a well to be located on 
the ground being purchased from McGarry for the pur-
pose of irrigating said land (Plaintiff's Ex. 5). 
On February 26th·, 1946, Hintzen assigned this appli-
cation to McGarry by written assignment, the considera-
tion for such written assign:q1ent being a transaction 
whereunder Hintzen returned 80 of the 100 acres being 
purchased from McGarry and receiving from McGarry in 
lieu thereof another 80-acre tract ~it]:l an approved water 
application (Reporter's Tr. 5). 
Later, on April 6th, 1946, Hintzen gave Thompson a 
written assignment of the identical application thereto-
fore assigned McGarry. The consideration for this as-
signment was the doing of some work by Thompson on 
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the Hintzen grountl-not on the ground turned back to 
l\IcGarry but on the ne"" 80-acre tract acquired by Hintzen 
from McGarry. It is stated in appellants' brief· on page 5 
that Hintzen remained on the property described in the 
sales contract until }fay or June of 1946 and that Thomp-
son entered into his agreement with Hintzen to take the 
water .assignment, and did the work on Hintzen's ground, 
during the first part of April, 1946. Such statement is 
incorrect. Thompson claims to have commenced work on 
Aprillst and to have completed it on the 15th and 16th of 
the same month (Rep. Tr. 11). Hintzen had already given 
lip possession and moved off the eighty acres exchanged 
to McGarry, and was residing on th~ new tract when 
Thompson took the assignment and did the work for 
Hintzen (Rep. Tr. 34-35-36). 
On the 9th day of August, 1946, Thompson filed in the 
office of the state engineer a change application by which 
be proposed to change the point of divers~on of waters 
from the point set forth in the Hintzen application to a 
new well site and to change the place of use of the entire 
4.0 c.f.s. of water. 
Thereafter and within the time allow.ed by law Mc-
Garry filed his protest to the granting and approval of 
the change application, and on March 3rd, 1947, the state 
engineer, Without a formal, or any hearing, approved the 
change application. (Alleged in complaint and admitted 
in ans\\rers). 
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That on or before the 31st of 11arch, 1947, an appeal 
'vas duly taken from the decision of the state engineer, 
and the appellants were both personally served with sum-
mons and notice of appeal. 
On May 7th, 1947, several months after the protest 
to the change application was filed, and several weeks 
after the appeal was taken from the state engineer's 
decision, Thompson commenced 'vork on the well at the 
ne'v location and under the change application (Rep. Tr. 
15 and 17). 
The issues upon which this case was tried, presented 
to the trial court; submitted, argued and determined, are 
as follows: 
The complaint pleads that !fcGarry became the sole 
o'vner of the original Hintzen application by virtue of 
his assignment dated Feb. 26, 1946; that Thompson claims 
to have an assignment of the same 'vater application ac-
quired from Hintzen on April 6th, 1946; that the Thomp-
son assignment had no legal effect or value because when 
given to Thompson the said Hintzen had nothing to convey 
and retained no right in or title to such application, and 
consequently Th~mpson acquired no right, title or inter-
est in the application. The only issue raised by the com-
plaint was the matter of priority of the two assignments 
(Tr. t" to 5). . 
The answer of Thompson squarely meets that issue 
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by claiming he purchased the assignment for a valuable 
consideration, made in good faith and "rithout notice; that 
at the time of such purchase there 'vas no record in the 
office of the state engineer or in the office of the County 
Recorder of Iron County, Utah, indicating that McGarry 
claimed any interest in the application, and Thompson 
counterclaims by alleging practically the same facts and 
asking that he be adjudged the o'vner of the application 
(Tr. 20 to 23). 
The anS\\er of the state engineer by way of defense 
pleads the priority of the Thompson assignment for the 
sole and only reason that it 'vas presented to his office for 
recording about April 16th, 1946, and that the 1IcGarry 
assignment was filed in his office about December 20th, 
1946. The state engineer also pleads in the affirmative 
defense that he was informed and believes that at the 
time Thompson accepted the assignment from Hintzen he! 
the said Thompson, had no kno\vledge of the existence 
of any prior assignment by Hintzen to John McGarry and 
that Thompson paid value for such assignment and re-
ceived it 'vithout notice of any outstanding claims, and 
for value (Tr. 10 to 15). 
The state engineer and Thompson, by their pleadings, 
defended solely on the proposition of priorities. Even a 
cursory examination of the pleadings and the proceedings 
at the trial will conclusively sho'v that the case was not 
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only pleaded, but was tried and argued and submitted to 
the trial court on but two propositions, to-wit: 
First, did the McGarry prior assignment, as a mat-
ter of law, take precedence over the subsequent Thompson 
assignment, although the Thompson assignment was filed 
for reco~d in the office of the state engineer prior to the 
JVIcGarry assignment; and., 
Second, the factual situation as to whether or not 
Thompson was a purchaser in good faith, and without 
notice. 
The trial court held for the respondent, McGarry, on 
each of those two propositions. If this Honorable Court 
sustains the trial court on either of those propositions, 
the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. 
In view of the ,position no'v taken by both appellants 
-and for the first time on this appeal-we urge this 
Court to bear in mind the issues raised by the pleadings, 
and being the issues upon which the case was tried, argued, 
submitted, and determined by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
We shall :p.ow address ourselves to the first proposi-
tion argued by the appellants, wherein it is contended 
that an unapproved application to appropriate water is 
not assignable. 
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The proposition adYanced by the appellants is falla-
cious and should- not no"T be considered for the many 
f ollo,ving reasons : 
1. It is raised for the first time on this appeal. It. 
"1'as neither pleaded, tried, argued, submitted or deter-
mined by the trial court on that issue, nor 'vas the trial 
court given an opportunity to pass upon that contention. 
It is elementary that a case will not be reYiewed on a 
theory different than that upon which it 'vas tried and 
determined by the trial court. 
Furthermore, if the appellants intended to rely on 
the defense that the Hintzen application was unapproved 
and therefore not assignable, J\ticGarry should have b~en 
given an opportunity to meet that~ issue at the trial. The 
appellants state that the Hintzen application was not ap-
proved, but the record does not so show. 
In the early case of Aaron vs. Holmes, 99 Pac. 450, 
35 Utah 49, it was said: 
"It is also a 'vell settled rule that a theory, as-
sumed and acted upon by the parties litigant in the 
trial court, must be adhered to upon appeal. One of 
the most important results of the rule that questions 
which are not raised in the court below cannot be re-
viewed in the appellate court is that a party cannot, 
when a cause is brought up for appellate review, as-
sume an attitude inconsistent with that taken by him 
at the trial, and that such party is restricted to the 
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theory of the cause of action.'' 
''Suit to quiet title to water arising from spring 
on plaintiff's land having been tried on theory that 
water was originally public water subject to appropri-
ation, Supreme Court cannot dispose of cause on a 
different theory.'' Holman, et al. vs. Christensen, 27 4 
Pac. 457, 73 Utah 389. 
2. If the application from Hintzen to McGarry, even 
assuming it was unapproved, was therefore not assign-
able, ho'v does Thompson gain his rights thereunderf Can 
Thompson acquire more rights under an assignment than 
can McGarry~ 
It is argued by appellants that McGarry could acquire 
no rights under an unapproved application, yet -Thomp-
son, according to appellants, could acquire rights under 
the identical application, and the state engineer can ap-
prove a change application based on such identical appli-
cation and can give Thompson permission to drill a well 
under the change application filed thereafter and there-
under. According to appellants' argument and conten-
tion, an assignment is good as to one person but not as 
to another; the application of Hintzen is sufficient for the 
purpose of assigning to Thompson-but not for the purpose 
of assigning to McGarry. 
This Court must assume the approval of the Hintzen 
application from the very fact that he disallowed the Me-
Garry protest and approved Thompson's change applica-
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tion and granted him permission to drill a well, all with·· 
out any hearing 'vhateY(\r and most perfunctorily. 
3. The state engineer never considered the provi-
sions of Section 100-3-8, lT.C.A. 1943, when holding the 
Thompson application took precedence over the ~{cGarry 
application, nor are the provisions of that section applic-
able, either under the issue~ or other"rise. We fail to see 
ho" .. that section has any application. 
Neither appellant pleaded that the state engineer had 
concluded there was no unappropriated water availabl<~ 
on the Hintzen property, that the Hintzen land was unfit 
for irrigation, that Hintzen or McGarry had no financial 
ability to complete the proposed well, or even that Mc-
Garry had secured the assignment for purely speculative 
purposes. The appellants could have pleaded such facts 
and raised that issue, but did not do so. 
l\Ioreover, we call attention that the respondent al-
leged and the appellants admitted that the state eng·ineer 
allo\ved the change application and disallowed the nlc-
Gnrry protest 'vithout a formal or any heartng. 
The conclusion is inescapable that when the state 
engineer disallowed l\IcGarry's protest and approved 
'fhompson's change application without any hearing· it 
was solely on the basis of Section 100-3-18, U.C.A., 194:1, 
interpreting it to mean that as a matter of law Thomp-
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10 
son had a lega1 priority because Thompson had- filed his 
assignm_ent before-~ l\{cGarry filed his, and even then .the 
~tate engineer disregarded }vfcGarry 's right to prov~ 
Thon1pson "'as not a purchaser for value without notice. 
r.rhe fact is that the disallo,vance of the ~.fcGarry prote~t 
and the approval of the change application 'vithout a hear-
ing 'vas rather capricious and arbitrary. ij:o,vever, we 
'vould be loathe to believe that the state engineer would, 
'vithout giving !{cGarry an opportunity to be heard or 
to kno'v from what sources he gained the information, 
find that :ivlcGarry did not have the financial ability to 
complete the well, that his acquisition of the assignment 
of the application was not in good faith but for specula-
tion or monopoly (he already owned the land upon which 
the 'vell "'as to be drilled) or that any of the reasons set 
forth in said Section 100-3-18 were persuasive to his rul-
ing. We are more loathe to believe that if such reasons 
existed and such facts believed to be true, the state engi-
neer would 'vithhold them from the trial court and not 
even plead or attempt to prove them. But-the state en-
gineer does not say such facts and reasons exist; he pnly 
says ''it may be'' so. 
He fails to take any position whatever; he does not 
say any such facts or reasons exist, but wants this court 
to determine this case for the reason that "it may be" so. 
fie does not even say any investigation was made or that 
he had the slightest inkling as to any of the facts. 
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4. _.A.n application to appropriate "\Yater, at least 
until it is disapproYed, and 'vhile it is pending in the office 
of the state engineer 'vithout either approval or disap-
proval, is a Yaluable property right and is more than "a 
mere possibility or expectancy not co~tpled with an in-
terest." 
There can be no question but 'vhat an application to 
appropriate water, 'vhen filed in the office of the state 
engineer, is a valuable property right. Section 100-3-18 
which provides that ''rights claimed under applications 
for the appropriation of water may be transferred or 
assigned by instruments in writing'' makes no distinction 
between approved and unapproved applications. It has 
never been contended before, to our knowledge, that an 
application to appropriate water may not be assignea 
until after its approve!. The state engineer will make no 
such contention because he has accepted and recognized 
assignments of applications prior to approval upon in-
numerable occasions. To so hold would be to be read into 
the statute something which is not there. '-
In the case of Whitmore vs. Murray City, 154 Pac. 
(2nd) 748, (107 Utah 445), at page 751, it is said: 
''Property rights in water consist not alone in the 
amount of the- appropriation, but also in the priority 
of the appropriation. It often happens that the chief 
value of an appropriation consists in its priority over 
other appropriations from the same natural stream. 
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Hence to deprive a person of his priority is to de-
prive him of a most valuable property right.'' 
The ·case of Duchesne County vs. -Hm:Uphreys, 148 
Pac. (2nd) 338, 106 Utah 332, discusses an application to 
appropriate unappropriated water as a ''right.'' It is 
said : ''The first step in acquiring such a right is the fil-
ing of an application with the state engineer. The filing 
of the application does not give the applicant a vested 
right * * * it merely gives a right to complete the appro-
priation and put the water to a beneficial use in compli-
ance of the act.' ' And certainly this Court, in speaking of 
the first step in acquiring a ''right'' by the filing of an 
application_ with the state engineer, had in mind the fact 
that the application could not be approved until after it 
was made and filed. 
''The first step toward making an appropriation 
* * * may be protected through a suit to quiet title.'' 
Mohave River Irr. Dist. vs. Superior Court, 256 Pac. 
469 at page 472 (Cal). 
"One may protect his 'incipient right' to water 
against hostile invasions and claims of others. And 
the same doctrine is announced in the later case of 
Merritt vs. City of Los Angeles, 120 , Pac. 1064. So 
here the plaintiffs may safeguard their rights, al-
though water has as yet been brought into close prox-
imity to their lands." Byington vs. Sacramento Val-
ley West Side Canal Co., 148 Pac. 791 at page 794 
(Cal). 
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To the same effect are the cases: 
Inyo Consolidated ''rater Co. vs. Jess, et al., 119 
Pac. 934. 
~Ierritt Ys. City of Los Angeles, 120 Pac. 1064~ 
II. 
Addressing ourselves to the second proposition ad-
Yanced by appellants to the effect that Thompson was a 
bona fide purchaser for value of the Hi:ritzen application, 
we assert that the court found, as a factual matter, that 
Thompson was not a purchaser in good faith and without 
notice, and that such finding is amply supported by the 
evidence. 
On cross-examination Thompson testified substan-
tially to the following: 
He came into the country (Iron County) in November, 
1945; that he intended to engage in farming in that vi-
cinity (Tr. 24); that he and a ~fr. Frailey purchased 960 
acres of ground and 'vas advised and assured by McGarry 
that one well of 4.0 second feet 'vould be sufficient to 
irrigate 160 acres and that he and Frailey applied for 
wells of 4.0 second feet each to irrigate each 160 acres. 
When Hintzen 'vas discussing with Thompson the deal 
whereby the application would be assigned, Thompson 
kne'\\T that Hintzen had turned back to McGarry 80 of the 
100 acres acquired from 1\'IcGarry and which land was to 
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be irrigated from the Hintzen \Veil. On 11arch 19th, 1946, 
Thompson \Vas in. the office of the state engineer making 
inquiry in regards to transferring well permits and 
\Vhether he could get permission so to do. He examined 
the book of \Vell permits and checked wells that had not 
been drilled. (Having made this check he kne,v, of course, 
that the I-Iintzen \Vell had been applied for to irrigate the 
100 acres which Hintzen had purchased from McGarry 
and described as being in the SEl/ 4 of Sec. 8, Tp. 35 S. ,R. 
16 \\T ., S.L.:1I.). He returned from Salt Lake and on the 
following day he had a conversation with McGarry at 
Cedar City. He made no mention to :1IcGarry of his pro-
posed deal \Yi th Hintz en although he had previously gotten 
the name of Hintzen, as having a \Yell right, from the rec-
ords of the state engineer. He made no inquiry from 
l\fcGarry as to \vhether 1\fcGarry had taken back the water 
rights ''~th the land, although he knew :1IcGarry, and had 
done business "Ti th him and could easily have discussed the 
mattflr. I-Iintzen had giYen up possession of the acreage 
\vhich he turned back to l\1cGarry, had moved his house 
from the McGarry tract to a new tract \vhich had a water 
right attached thereto, all of which was known to Thomp-
son. The work 'vhich Thompson claims to have done was 
on the new tract and no \vork was done by Hintzen on 
the 1\IcGarry tract. Thompson knew the Hintzen applica-
tion was for 4.0 second feet to irrigate 100 acres but testi-
fied he kne'v nothing about the duty of water and had no 
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idea that 4.0 second fet't 'Yonld be more than sufficient to 
irrigate the t'Yenty aeres "chich IIintzen had not turned 
back to ~IcGarry. Thompson testifeid also that he knew 
nothing about the dl1ty of 'va ter and "rhether the duty of 
"Tater \Yas 4.0 second feet for 160 acres or for 40 acres. 
He testified also that he neYer questioned Hintzen as to 
'vhether Hintzen had turned the application back to Mc-
Garry with the land and never questioned the ownership 
of the well permit, because he never 'vent into anyone's 
personal business, ( R.ep. Tr. 22-23). 
McGarry testified (Rep. Tr. 37-38) in the fall of 1945, 
months before Thompson made his deal with Hintzen and 
prior to the purchase of land by Thompson and Frailey 
there were discussions about the. duty of water and 
Thompson was advised one second foot ·\vas sufficient to 
irrigate 40 acres and that a \Vell right for 4.0 second feet 
would i1~rigate 160 acres ; that Thompson made applica-
tion to the state engineer for well permits to irrigate the 
960 acres and made his application on the basis of 4.0 sec-
ond feet for each 160 acres. -
The trial court evidently did not giVe credence to 
Thompson's testimony concerning his total and supreme 
ignorance about water rights and the duty of water and 
his reasons for not making further inquiry. 
Were all of the foregoing facts sufficient to put 
Thompson on notice that Hintzen might have disposed of 
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the water to ~lcGarry when turning back the land for 
which the \Vater had been applied, and thus put Thomp-
son on inquiry 1 The trial court believed that when the 
land was turned back to ~fcGarry and Thompson was so 
advised by Hintzen before the assignment was given to 
Thompson, and when Thompson kne'v that the Hintzen 
application was made to irrigate the premises \vhich had 
been turned back, and 'vhen he knew that even though 
Hintzen retained 20 of the 100 acres he could not retain 
and hope to secure a certificate of appropriation of 4.0 
second feet to irrigate 20 acres of land, it was sufficient 
to put Thompson on notice and inquiry. After all, 
Thompson kne\v McGarry-kne\V \vhere }.fcGarry was lo-
eated and could be contacted; he had had dealings and 
conversations with McGarry and could easily have ascer-
tained the true situation by a simple inquiry from Me-
Garry-particularly after kno"ring that Hintzen had ac-
quired from McGarry a nev{ tract of land with an attached 
and appurtenant water right in exchange for the old tract 
for \vhich water had been applied. Thompson was a 
farmer and realized the value of water to land and knew 
that land in the vicinity in question could not be of much 
Yalue "rithout water. Thompson undoubtedly from his 
discussions with McGarry, his application to the state en-
gineer for \veil rights on the 960 acres being· purchased, 
and his visit to the office of the state engineer, kne"'' or 
suspected, or should have kno'\\rn and suspected that the" 
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liintzen land would not be turned back 'vithout the well 
permit for tl1e irrig-ation thereof, and he could have ascer-
tained the fact by a simple inquiry. Vl e cannot see ho'v 
the trial court could have done other"'ise than find that 
Thompson was not a purchaser in good faith and without 
notice. 
The broad rule is laid do"'"ll in the late case of 
:Jieagher Ys. Dean, et al., 91 Pac. (2nd) 454, 97 Utah 173, 
as follows: 
"\.Vhate:ver is notice enough to excite attention 
and put the purchaser on his guard and call for in-
quiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry 
might have led.'' 
See 0 'Reilly vs. McLean, et al., 37 Pac. (2nd) 770, 84 
Utah 551, ''herein it is held ''where purchaser had such 
information as will put ordinarily prudent person on in-
quiry, purchaser must make such inquiry and is charged 
with notice which could have been obtained from such in-
quiry." 
''One who has constructive notice of an outstand-
ing title or right is not a bona fide purchaser. It has 
been held that constructive_ notice rests upon strictly 
legal presumptions 'vhich are not allowed to be con-
troverted, while implied notice arises from an infer-
ence of facts and is a form of actual notice. Regard-
less, however, of the technical distinction made by 
some courts between constructive notice and implied 
actual notice, it is a general rule that knowledge of 
such facts as ought to put a prudent man on inquiry 
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as to the title charges a subsequent purchaser with 
notice, not only of those facts -which are actually 
known, but also of all the other facts which a reason-
ably diligent investigation would have ascertained, 
provided the inquiry becomes a duty and would lead 
to the knowledge of the requisite facts by the ever-
cise of ordinary diligence and understanding. * * * * 
In applying the rule each case must be governed by 
its own peculiar circumstances." 66 C.J. page 1111. 
''A purchaser who is put on inquiry does- not 
discharge his duty by making inquiry of his vendor 
alone but must exhaust all reasonable and available 
sources of information and hence the fact that the 
purchaser is misled by the vendor's false statements 
is not sufficient to protect him.'' 66 C.J. page 1115. 
''If purehasers of realty from corporation hold--
ing record title 'vere put on notice regarding corpora-
tion's actual status as second mortgagee and did not 
make reasonable inquiry, purchasers were charged 
with knowledge of all facts that they might have 
learned had such diligence been exercised, as regards 
mortgagor's interest in such realty." Murray vs. 
Wiley, 127 Pac. (2nd} 112. (Wyo). 
The question as to whether Thompson 'vas an Inno-
C(1llt purchaser for value 'vithout notice, was one of fact 
for the trial court. 
"Where it does not appear by a clear preponder-
ance of the evidence that the trial judge was wrong 
in his findings of fact, they must stand." Hoggan vs. 
Price River Irr. Co., 216 Pac. 237, 61 Utah 547, citing 
numerous Utah cases. 
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To the same eff eet see : 
Froyd Ys. Barnhurst, 28 Pac. (2nd) 135, 83 Utah 
•) .... 1 
..J' . 
l\lollerup Ys. Dayncs-Bebee 1\{usic Co., 24 Pac. 
(2nd) 306, 8~ Utah 299. 
\\ ... e are inclined to the vie"'" that the instant case is 
a law and not an equity case, and, of course, in such event 
the rule is that if there is any evidence to support the 
court's findings, such findings may not be disturbed by 
the appellate court. But, even though it is determined 
that this is an equity· case we are convinced beyond ques-
tion that there is ample evidence to support the trial 
court's findings and it not appearing by a clear prepon-
derance of the evidence that the trial judge was wrong in 
his findings, they must stand. 
''Obviously, the question as to whether defendant 
'vas an innocent purchaser for value without notice 
,,~as, under the issues, one of fact for the trial court. 
If there is any substantial evidence which would sup-
port the trial court's findings that defendant was not 
an innocent purchaser for value and without notice, 
the judgment would have to be sustained.'' Davis vs. 
Kleindienst, 169 Pac. (2nd) 78, at page 81. 
Moreover, in the above cause of Davis vs. Klein-
dienst, supra, it is held that: 
The controversial question in the case was 
whether defendant was an innocent purchaser for 
value and without notice. This question is to be de-
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termined under the ordinary rule, by a preponderance 
of the testimony. 66 C. J. 1201, Sec. 1065, Vendor and 
Purchaser. The evidence as to this need not be 
clear convincing and satisfactory. If, therefore, 
therd is any reasonable evidence to justify the court 
in finding that the defendant purchased without no-
tice, or was not a purchaser for value, then the judg-
ment should be sustained.'' 
In order to have some basis upon which to insist that 
1\1cGarry is estopped from setting up his interest, appel-
lant Thompson makes numerous statements in his brief 
that cannot be sustained by any proof whatever, either 
actually or by inference. \V e call attention to statements 
on pages 20, 26 and 27 of appellants' brief, wherein it is 
said that ~IcGarry participated in and approved ''the 
plan'' for Hintzen to make application in his own name, 
notwithstanding the land stood in the name of McGarry; 
that McGarry took part in having the application placed 
in Hintzen's name for the purpose of holding out to the 
world that Hintzen was the owner; that McGarry was in-
strumental in having the water right application placed 
and permitted to stand in the name of Hintzen, etc. We 
presume the basis for these statements is the clause in 
the sales contract between McGarry and Hintzen as fol-
lo,vs: 
"It is agreed that in the event the buyer or any 
assignee or assignees shall make application to ap-
propriate water or shall procure a certificate of ap-
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propriation to appropriate water from wells located 
upon said premises and said buyer or assignee or 
assignees shall thereafter default in this contract 
the seller shall immediately become the assignee of 
any such application or applications and the state 
engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized to 
recognize said seller as the assignee of any such appli-
cation and in the event a certificate of appropriation 
has issued to the buyer the water rights thereunder 
shall be considered as appurtenant to the said prem-
ises and in the event of default the title thereto shall 
immediately pass to the seller.'' 
The appellants no\\r seek to bolster their position by 
innuendoes entirely "'ithout justification. Respondent 
submits that the real estate contract was usual, and sim-
ilar agreements executed constantly; and that under such 
agreement the buyer, Hintzen, and not the seller, ~IcGar·· 
ry, would make application to appropriate water, if he 
wanted water. Furthermore, there is nothing in the con-
tract that required Hintzen to make application to ap-
propriate water. The fact is that the contract was made 
on July 21st, 1945, and Hintzen did not make application 
until the 17th of August, 1945, about a month later. There 
is no proof that McGarry advised or insisted that Hintzen 
make such application or was at all interested in the appli-
cation. A clause in a sales contract, providing that in the 
event improvements be made on premises under purchase 
and in the event the contract goes into default, such im-
provements remain as a part of the realty, is indeed very 
common, particularly when applied to improvements 
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about which there might later be some contention as to 
appurtenancy. We are at a loss to know why, under the 
circumstances, anyone but Hintzen, who was buying the 
land, 'vould make the application, or why, having been 
made in the name of Hintzen, the transaction becomes 
suspect. This situation is not analogous to one where an 
owner of premises holds out to the world that he· is not 
such owner and has no interest therein, and thereby mis-
leads a third party to his injury. How can Thompson be 
heard to say that he was misled and McGarry was es-
topped from claiming an interest in the application, when 
the record shows that T~ompson himself purchased land 
from lVIcGarry and made application in his own name for 
appropriations of water. Had the matter of estoppel 
been pleaded, McGarry could easily have met· that issue 
by showing that Frailey and Thompson purchased 960 
acres of land under an almost identical contract with the 
same provisions written therein. 
We are quite in accord with the statement of appellant 
that if the facts pleaded constitute an estoppel, it is suffi-
cient; but fail to see how any facts pleaded either by 
Thompson or the state engineer constitute an estoppel or 
were even intended so to do. Certainly the cases cited by 
appellant to sustain such_ a proposition have no applica-
tion to the instant cause. The only facts pleaded as a de-
fense are those claiming that ThoJI!pson was a purchaser 
in good faith and without notice and that his filin()' of the 
0 
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Hintzen assignment in the offiee of the state engineer 
prior to the filing of .JieGarry 's assignment gave him a 
first priority and a go0d title. 
"The la"~ is 'veil settled that the facts relied upon 
as constituting an estoppel must be pleaded." Barber 
YS. Anderson, 27 4 Pac. 136, 73 Utah 357. 
'• In an action under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 1206, for 
goods furnished defendant's 'vife, plaintiff cannot re-
coYer on the ground that though the family relation 
had ceased to exist at the time of the sale, the defend-
ant 'vas estopped by his conduct to deny liability, 
"-here such estoppel was not pleaded.'' Berow vs. 
Shields, 159 Pac. 538, 48 Utah 270. 
In Utah Pacific Digest, ,.,. ol. 15, under Estoppel, Sec. 
110, are found innumerable cases from all jurisdictions 
in the west to the effect that an estoppel must be pleaded 
to be available and that the facts relied on as showing es-
toppel must be pleaded. It is true, of course, that in a 
suit to quiet title, where the plaintiff does not set forth 
or plead in his complaint the precise claim of title which 
will be relied on, nor the muniments establishing the 
title, then facts establishing an estoppel may be proved 
under the general issue; but it is idle for appellant to 
argue here that McGarry did not set out the source of his 
title. He specifically pleaded Hintzen 's application, and 
his subsequent succession thereto by assignment. He 
specifically set out Thompson's claim of the title and the 
source thereof, to-wit, the assignment of the Hintzen ap-
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plication at a later date to Thompson, Thompson's change 
application and the state engineer's wrongful approval 
thereof. Thompson filed an answer raising certain issues, 
none of which pleaded estoppel or were intended so to do. 
The estoppel theory is one evolved long after the trial and 
submission of the issues to the trial court. 
vV e agree that the application here involved is of 
great value because the Governor of Utah has issued a 
public proclamation pursuant to Sec. 100-8-1, U.C.A. 1943, 
declaring that ·no more water may be appropriated in the 
area where Hintzen filed his application to appropriate 
water. But it has as great a value to McGarry as it does 
to Thompson. Neither may now secure water from the 
underground source through filing an application to ap-
propriate water. If it be argued that Thompson had ex-
pended moneys in drilling a well under his change applica-
tion it should be remembered that the well was drilled 
not only after McGarry protested the change application 
but after this action was com1nenced to question the rul-
ing of the state engineer in allowing such change applica-
tion. 
III. 
·The state engineer's chief reliance for the correct-
ness of his position and the construction of Section 100-S: 
18, U.C.A. 1943, which he contends for, ~ies in the ruling 
of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Wells Far0'·0 
' ' ' 0 
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& Co. YS. Smith, et al., 2 Utah 39, and affirmed by the 
l~. S. Supreme Court in the case of Neslin vs. Wells, 
104 u. s. 428. 
We cannot agree that the statute under construction 
by the Utah Supreme Court and the U. S. Supreme Court 
is a direct parallel to Section 100-3-18. There are numer-
ous differences as to facts, circumstances and status of 
statutes. The statutes in effect in 1870 were applicable 
"'"hen the facts in the above case arose. The only provi-
sions applicable, aside from creating the office of County 
Recorder, were the provisions that the recorders should 
provide themselves with good and well bound books suit-
able for the purpose and record therein all transfers or 
conveyances of land or tenements and all other instru-
ments of writing and documents suitable, necessary and 
proper to be recorded, and that the books should be in-
dexed in alphabetical order and free. to examination of 
all persons, and upon filing of any paper for record the 
recorder should endorse upon the back thereof the time of 
receiving it. The statute became effective March 2nd, 
1850. The case was never over-ruled expressly, nor could 
there be any occasion to do so because the case was decided 
on a statute in effect in 1873 when the Wells Fargo case 
facts arose, and in 187 4 the recording statutes were 
amended expressly to provide that a failure to record 
would make a conveyance void as· against a subsequent 
-purchaser without notice. However, the case was decided 
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on a two to one opinio~, and the statements and rule of 
la'v set forth in the dissenting opinion have since been 
re-stated and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as well 
as every other western jurisdiction when the matter of a 
recording statute has been in question. The Wells Fargo 
case has never been cited, so far as we can determine, in 
any subsequent case, and under recording statutes similar 
to ours, as authority for the position now taken by the ap-
pellants in this cause. 
The statute in question, Sec. 100-3-18, provides that 
''From the time of filing of same'' it imparts notice to 
all persons of the contents thereof. (In his brief the state 
engineer in commenting on this statute makes no mention 
of the words "from the time of filing the same"). It 
fails to provide ,as does the statute concerning the re-
cordation of water deeds anq the recordation of other in-
struments ''and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and 
lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with 
notice thereof.'' It simply affirms that from the time of 
filing, notice is imparted to persons of the contents of the 
assignment. It was enacted at the same time as Section 
100-1-10. Both Section 100~3-18 and 100-1-10 (the water 
deed statute) were a part of the 1919 Act found in Ses-
sion Laws of 1919. Section 78-3-2 and 78-3-3 were in 
effect when the legislature provided for the filing of as-
signments of rights claimed under applications for ap:.. 
propriations of water in the office of the state engineer, 
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so the legislature kne,Y, or 've must presum.e it kne,v, that 
concerning- recording of documents in the office of the 
county recorder there "'"as a statute providing for a pen-
alty for failure to record; and it kne,v, or we must presume 
it kne"""' that concerning 'Yater deeds being recorded (Sec. 
100-1-10) there '"'"as a provision not only that from the 
time of filing- the same 'Yith the recorder notice 'vas given 
to all persons of the contents thereof, but also a provision 
''and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien hold-
ers shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice 
thereof.'' 
Sec. 100-5-12 is the section requiring the filing of 
notice of underground claims with the state engineer. It 
is significant that this section also provides ''failure to 
file notice of claim or claims, as provided in this section, 
shall be prima facie evidence of intent to abandon such 
claimed right and in the distribution of the underground 
water of this state the state engineer may disregard any 
claim not so filed. ' ' The legislature expressly provided 
the penalty for failure to record und~rground claims but 
provided no penalty whatever for failure to record assign-
ments of applications. It contented itself with stating that 
''from the time of filing the assignment notice would be 
imparted of the contents of the assignment.'' 
When the Wells-Fargo case was decided, it was de-
cided entirely on the basis "it was a common thing, one 
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of public notoriety, to record mortgages and other con-
veyances, and that fact that there were offices in each 
county for the purpose of making such recordations was 
also a matter of public notoriety." But there is no assur-
ance that. the Territorial Court of Utah would have con-
strued Sec. 100-3-18 as the state engineer would have this 
Court construe it, in the face of the language contained in 
Sections 100-1-10, 100-5-12, 78-3-2 and 78-3-3, had such sec. 
tions or statutes existed at that time. Moreover, it is sig-
nificant that immediately following the decision in the 
Wells-Fargo case and in the. face of the favorable holding, 
the legislature in 187 4 amended its first recording statutes 
and provided expressly for the penalty when the instru-
ment was not recorded. 
By the overwhelming weight of authority in more 
recent cases than the Wells-Fargo case, our Supreme 
Court and other jurisdictions have held that recording 
statutes are not enlarged by implication. See Doris Trust 
Co. vs. Quermbach, 133 Pac. (2nd) 1003, at page 1006, 103 
Utah 120; wherein it is stated: ''Constructive notice from 
a record is wholly a creature of statute. No record will 
operate to give constructive notice unless such effect is 
given such record· by statute.'' 
"It is to be noted that constructive notice by rec-
ord or registration was unknown to the common law. 
Such notice is a matter of statutory origin and in the 
absence of statutory provision the record of a chattel 
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mortg·ag·e would not constitute notice for any purpose 
\V.hen the terms of the statute are compiled with the 
record becomes conclusi Ye notice, often contrary to 
the fact. \r e cannot read into the statutes the harsh 
rule of constructive notice in the absence of legisla-
ti\e expression.'' Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav-
ings .6.-\.ssn. Ys. X a tiona I Funding Corp., 114 Pac. (2nd) 
49. 
''The recording of an instrument is constructive 
notice to those who acquire interests subsequent to 
execution of instrument or 'vho, in dealing with prop-
erty are compelled to search the records in order to 
protect their own interests, but it does not affect the 
rights of prior parties.'' Ryan vs. Plath, 140 Pac. 
(2nd) 968. 
"Common-la" ... rule that grantee -was not obli-
gated to record deed has been changed in California, 
but extent of change is expressed in statute." Noble 
vs. Blanchard, 8 Pac. (2nd) 523. 
Section 100-3-18 expressly provides that notice of the 
contents of the assignment filed in the office of the state 
engineer imparts notice to all persons of the contents 
thereof ''from the time of filing. '' When there is no 
penalty provided for failure to record or file a prior as-
signment, the notice is not imparted to a prior assignee, 
hnt notice is imparted onlv from the time of filing or to 
a subsequent assign~e. This proposition has been well 
settled in the cases of Askerson vs. Elliott, 165 Pac. 899 ; 
and Ryan vs. Plath, 140 Pac. (2nd) 968, and other ca~es 
therein cited. 
''Furthermore, the deed to that company did not 
constitute constructive notice to appellant, since she 
"\Yas not a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer. 
• 
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The recording of an instrument pursuant to a record-
ing statute such as Rem-Rev. State Sec. 10596, is con-
structive notice to those persons only who acquire 
interests subsequent to the execution of the instru-
ment, or who, in deali .. ng with property, are compelled 
to search the public records in order to protect their 
own· interests ; it does not affect the right,s of prior 
·parties.'' Ryan VR. Plath, 140 Pac. (2nd) .968, citing 
45 Am. Jur. 470, Records and Recording Laws, Sec. 
89. 
Are the concluding words in Section 100-1-10 con-
cerning deeds of a water right-'' and subsequent pur-
chasers, mortgagees and lien-holders shall be deemed to 
purchase and take with notice thereof''-of any meaning 
whatsoever? Or are such words mere surplusage~ Such 
'vords appear in the general recording statutes. But no 
euch words appear in Sec. 100-3-18. If the contention of 
the appellants. is correct, then the above 'vords in the gen-
eral recording statutes and in Sec. 100-·.1-10 are surplusage 
and have no meaning at all. They would not be necessary 
to shut out the right of one- failing to record. 
Thompson admits freely that before he took the Hint-
zen assignment he was advised by Hintzen !hat 80 acres 
of the land for whieh water was applied had been turned 
back to ~fcGarry. I..~ikewi.se, Thompson admitted freely 
that Hintzen was out of possession of the McGarry ground 
and had turned_ the possession back to McGarry. Under 
these circumstances we believe the rule announced in 
Neponset Land and Livestock Co. vs. Dixon, 37 Pac. 573, 
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10 lJ tah 334, -and follo,ved by a long· line of decisions in 
Utah, should apply. The rule there announced is ''The 
failure of a grantee "~ho is in possession of the land to 
record his deed does not render it void as to subsequent 
purchasers, as possession is notice to all the world of the 
holder's rig·hts. '' 
The state engineer asserts that he is alarmed over 
the holding that some third party may hold title to an 
unapproved application without ever recording that as-
signment with the state engineer, because a duty has been 
imposed upon him by Section 100-3-8, which section has 
to do with the approval or disapproval of an application. 
And would his alarm be overcome if the assignment is 
made after the approval of the application, and the assign-
ment is not recorded for some time after~ 
Section 100-3-18 provides for filing of assignments 
in the office of the state engineer covering ''rights 
claimed unedr application~'' and makes no distinction 
between approved and unapproved applications. The leg-
islature did not see fit to require that an assignment be 
filed in the office of the state engineer, or provide for 
any time within which it must be so filed. It did not make 
void an assignment that was not filed in the office of the 
state engineer. It did not give the state engineer any 
power or authority to reject an approved application be-
cause the assignee happened to be engaged in the real 
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estate business. It did not prohibit the assignment of an 
application to a person engaged in the real estate busi-
ness .. The legislature did not give to the state engineer 
any discretionary power to refuse recognition of an as-
si~ment or to refuse to permit the assignee to proceed 
with the drilling of a well, or irrigation of land there-
after .. If the state engineer is so concerned about the pro-
visions of Sec. 100-3-8, he should know that he is required 
either to approve or reject the application. He is not 
given any right or authority to say to the original appli-
cant, ''I will reject the application if you assign it to Mr. 
McGarry, but I will approve it if you assign it to Mr. 
Thompson.'' 
We say flatly that the state engineer misstates the 
facts about his ot~er apprehensions-his right to investi-
gate various matters, and the fact that he approved the 
application only after it was shown that a different tract 
of land would be irrigated. He asserts in his brief (Pages 
41-42) that it is "unlikely" he would approve an appli-
cation to irrigate the lands covered by the original appli-
cation; that the court records show the application was not 
approved until March, 1947, as shown by Exhibit "0''; 
that it was approved after the apparent record owner had 
filed a change application showing an intention to irri-
gate a different tract of land. He asserts also (Page 44 
of brief) that "by so considering Thompson to be the 
owner the state engineer approved an application which 
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might never haYe been approYed had it remained on the 
old land and in the nan1e of ~IcGarry. '' 
The state enginer 's entire course of action belies his 
contentions. He does not say that he made any investiga-_ 
tion; much less does he mention the results of any inves-
tigation, nor why he did not hold a hearing, nor plead 
and attempt to prove any facts at the trial to show why 
he would not approve an application for a well on lands 
covered by the original application. He does not say nor 
attempt to indicate the basic differences between the land 
co,ered by the original application ~nd that covered by the 
change application, much less plead or attempt to prove 
any such facts at the triaL He wants this appellate court 
to deprive !IcGarry of his property rights by supposition, 
inuendo and possibility, 'vithout even saying it is a prob-
ability, or certainty. What mig·ht appear to be true is the 
statement made in his brief that he might never have ap-
proved the application if it had been in the name of Mc-
Garry, but for reasons undisclosed and based on facts 
remaining a secret. 
'V e further ~call attention that Thompson's testimony 
is to the effect that the state engineer (Rep. Tr. 32-33) 
sends an applicant a copper bank with an identifying num-
ber which is to be put on the well after it is drilled and 
that the state engineer sends instructions with each of 
these bands. He also testified that when he made the 
deal '\vith Hintzen and received the assignment (Rep. Tr. 
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23), Hintzen stated a copper band had previously been 
sent him by the state engineer and he sent it back. The 
sending of the copper band assuredly indicates that the 
state engineer had granted pern:tission to drill a well on 
the ground in which Hintzen 'vas then interested, and that 
the Hintzen application was approved. or intended to be 
approved. This effectually disposes of the contention 
that the application might not have been granted except-
ing for land covered by the change application. Can this 
Court believe, or up~old the doctrine, that the state engi-
neer may give permission to _drill a well at great expense 
before determining that the land is fit for irrigation, and 
afterwards take the position that he had not made an in-
Yestigation and that the land was unfit for irrigation~ 
Can this Court believe that the state engineer sent . the 
copper band without having approved or intending to ap-
prove the Hintzen application~ We think not. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court determined this cause in favor of the 
respondent on two grounds: First, that the failure of re• 
spondent to file his assignment in the office of the state 
engineer prior to the time when Thompson filed an assign-
ment did not give to ThQmpson a better title to the appli-
cation nor did it invalidate the prior acquired title there-
to by McGarry. Secondly, that the defendant Thompson 
was not a purchaser in good faith and without notice. 
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If the trial court ",.as correct in its determination on 
either of these theories and grounds, then the judgment 
must be affirmed. 
''If the trial court was correct as to either of 
t",.o g-rounds for its decision, the judgment must be 
affirmed." Raymond Ys. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 191 
Pac. (2nd) 137, - Utah -. 
We submit, therefore, that the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, wILSON Al!D CLINE, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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